Restrict domain administrators from having logon access to servers and workstations. Before starting this procedure, identify all OUs in the domain that contain workstations and servers. Any computers in OUs that are not identified will not restrict administrators with sensitive accounts from signing-in to them.
Restrict domain administrators from non-domain controller servers and workstations. Restrict server administrators from signing in to workstations, in addition to domain administrators. For this procedure, do not link accounts to the OU that contain workstations for administrators that perform administration duties only, and do not provide Internet or email access.
For more information, see Create dedicated workstation hosts for administrators. You can optionally add any groups that contain server administrators who you want to restrict from signing in to workstations.
Configure the user rights to deny batch and service logon rights for domain administrators as follows:. Completing this step might cause issues with administrator tasks that run as scheduled tasks or services with accounts in the Domain Admins group. The practice of using domain administrator accounts to run services and tasks on workstations creates a significant risk of credential theft attacks and therefore should be replaced with alternative means to run scheduled tasks or services.
Test the functionality of enterprise applications on workstations in the first OU and resolve any issues caused by the new policy. However, do not create a link to the Administrative Workstation OU if it is created for administrative workstations that are dedicated to administration duties only, and that are without Internet or email access. If you later extend this solution, do not deny logon rights for the Domain Users group.
The Domain Users group includes all user accounts in the domain, including Users, Domain Administrators, and Enterprise Administrators. Although user accounts are not marked for delegation by default, accounts in an Active Directory domain can be trusted for delegation.
This means that a service or a computer that is trusted for delegation can impersonate an account that authenticates to them to access other resources across the network.
For sensitive accounts, such as those belonging to members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, or Enterprise Admins groups in Active Directory, delegation can present a substantial risk of rights escalation.
For example, if an account in the Domain Admins group is used to sign in to a compromised member server that is trusted for delegation, that server can request access to resources in the context of the Domain Admins account, and escalate the compromise of that member server to a domain compromise.
It is a best practice to configure the user objects for all sensitive accounts in Active Directory by selecting the Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated check box under Account options to prevent these accounts from being delegated. For more information, see Setting for default local accounts in Active Directory. As with any configuration change, test this enabled setting fully to ensure that it performs correctly before you implement it. It is a best practice to strictly enforce restrictions on the domain controllers in your environment.
This ensures that the domain controllers:. One aspect of securing and managing domain controllers is to ensure that the default local user accounts are fully protected. It is of primary importance to restrict and secure all sensitive domain accounts, as described in the preceding sections.
Because domain controllers store credential password hashes of all accounts in the domain, they are high-value targets for malicious users.
When domain controllers are not well managed and secured by using restrictions that are strictly enforced, they can be compromised by malicious users.
For example, a malicious user could steal sensitive domain administrator credentials from one domain controller, and then use these credentials to attack the domain and forest. In addition, installed applications and management agents on domain controllers might provide a path for escalating rights that malicious users can use to compromise the management service or administrators of that service.
The management tools and services, which your organization uses to manage domain controllers and their administrators, are equally important to the security of the domain controllers and the domain administrator accounts. Ensure that these services and administrators are fully secured with equal effort.
Skip to main content. This browser is no longer supported. Download Microsoft Edge More info. Contents Exit focus mode. Is this page helpful? Please rate your experience Yes No. Any additional feedback? Note When the domain controller is initially installed, you can sign in and use Server Manager to set up a local Administrator account, with the rights and permissions you want to assign.
Important Rebooting a computer is the only reliable way to recover functionality as this will cause both the computer account and user accounts to log back in again.
If your environment requires DES, then this setting might affect compatibility with client computers or services and applications in your environment. Important Ensure that sensitive administrator accounts cannot access email or browse the Internet as described in the following section. Note If the administrators in your environment can sign in locally to managed servers and perform all tasks without elevated rights or domain rights from their workstation, you can skip this task.
Note In this procedure, the workstations are dedicated to domain administrators. Note You might have to delegate permissions to join computers to the domain if the account that joins the workstations to the domain does not already have them.
Important These instructions assume that the workstation is to be dedicated to domain administrators. Important Ensure that you either have local access to the domain controller or that you have built at least one dedicated administrative workstation. Note For this procedure, do not link accounts to the OU that contain workstations for administrators that perform administration duties only, and do not provide Internet or email access.
Note You can optionally add any groups that contain server administrators who you want to restrict from signing in to workstations. Note Completing this step might cause issues with administrator tasks that run as scheduled tasks or services with accounts in the Domain Admins group.
Important If you later extend this solution, do not deny logon rights for the Domain Users group. Submit and view feedback for This product This page. View all page feedback. In this article. Forces a password change the next time that the user logs signs in to the network.
Use this option when you want to ensure that the user is the only person to know his or her password. Prevents the user from changing the password. Use this option when you want to maintain control over a user account, such as for a Guest or temporary account. Prevents a user password from expiring.
It is a best practice to enable this option with service accounts and to use strong passwords. Prevents the user from signing in with the selected account.
As an administrator, you can use disabled accounts as templates for common user accounts. Requires that a user has a smart card to sign on to the network interactively. The user must also have a smart card reader attached to their computer and a valid personal identification number PIN for the smart card. When this attribute is applied on the account, the effect is as follows: The attribute only restricts initial authentication for interactive logon and Remote Desktop logon.
This invalidates the use of any previously configured passwords for the account. The value does not change after that unless a new password is set or the attribute is disabled and re-enabled. Accounts with this attribute cannot be used to start services or run scheduled tasks. Lets a service running under this account perform operations on behalf of other user accounts on the network. A service running under a user account also known as a service account that is trusted for delegation can impersonate a client to gain access to resources, either on the computer where the service is running or on other computers.
Trey Research wants to deploy Windows Server within the next 10 days but needs at least 1. They need this much disk space because Adprep. The following conditions contribute to the large global catalog size or the lack of disk space:. Condition 1: Trey Research was an early adopter of Windows and the largest drives that they received from their preferred hardware vendor were 9 GB or 18 GB when they were configured in a raid array.
Current drives are double the size for half the cost. Condition 3: Domain users were allowed to create computer accounts in the domain. Administrators did not have a recurring process to identify and delete orphaned computer accounts. In addition, auditing was enabled on the same partitions. When you set permissions and enable auditing on objects in Active Directory, the size of the database increases. The tool that prepares Windows forests and domains for Windows Server based domain controllers Adprep also adds inherited aces; therefore, Trey Research needed to free space on the disk drive before they upgraded the domain.
Condition 5: Trey Research did not regularly perform offline defragmentation procedures of Ntds. Each of these conditions was evaluated for its contribution to the GB. Condition 1: Trey Research decided not to deploy new drives because of the cost and the time it would take to do so.
Also, they only needed the disk space temporarily because they expected the Active Directory Database to shrink after they upgraded to Windows Server and the Single Instance Store SIS process was completed SIS implements a more efficient storage of permissions in Active Directory databases. Conditions 2 and 3: Trey Research decided that these conditions were the best practices; however, even if Trey Research implemented them, they would not achieve the needed results.
They decided to enable DNS scavenging because it is easily implemented. Because Trey Research has deployed Windows SP2 and a few hotfixes, they expected that the incremental inherited aces that were added by Adprep to objects in the domain NC could be as small as megabytes MBs. They could verify this behavior in a lab environment that is used to test upgrades of the production forest. Condition 5: Trey Research realized that if they performed an offline defragmentation procedure, they might not recover "whitespace" in the Ntds.
In fact, Trey Research administrators noticed an increase in database size immediately after they completed the offline defragmentation procedure. This behavior occurred because of an inefficiency in the Windows database engine; this engine is enhanced in Windows Server However, they realized that if they did so, additional disk space would not be freed up until the objects had been tombstoned and garbage collected, and until they completed an offline defragmentation procedure on each domain controller in that domain.
While the tombstone lifetime value can be set to values as low as two days, several domain controllers in the Trey Research forest were offline as they awaited hardware and software updates. If objects are tombstoned before end-to-end replication can take place, deleted objects may be reanimated or inconsistent data may be reported among global catalog servers in the forest.
To provide immediate relief, Trey Research performed the following procedure:. My physical server has been activated properly. Could this be an issue with just VMs? As an interesting side note at this point, my customer informs me that someone in a different department has decided to build more than a dozen virtual Windows Server machines as well. So now I assume I've got another dozen servers to deal with that won't be activating. But no! Those servers activated just fine. I went to this site to get the appropriate keys for my Standard version of Windows Server Some of my servers are Datacenter, but I need to fix this one first.
From here on out I only captured results from my Datacenter experiences, but they were the same. We get the awesome message that the product has been activated successfully! Now, what had gone wrong? Why did I have to remove the installed key and add those generic keys to get these machines to activate properly? Why did the other dozen or so machines activate with no issues? As I said earlier, I missed something key in the initial stages of looking at the issue.
I was thoroughly confused, so reached out to Charity from the initial blog post to see if she could help me. She saw the problem right away and helped me understand what I had missed early on. This lets us know that it is indeed a volume license.
I went back to my customer and asked if, by some chance, there was a second Windows Server ISO floating around the network. Turns out that yes, there was another ISO on the network, and it had been used to create the other dozen machines.
They removed that MSDN ISO from their network and now we have all our existing servers activated and no more worries about the activation failing on future builds. You must be a registered user to add a comment. If you've already registered, sign in. Otherwise, register and sign in. From here on, all volume licensed versions of Windows 8 and Windows Server will be activated as soon as they join the domain.
Multiple activations can be listed here. If you have both client and server SKUs, you'll have two activation objects. As long as the server object is available, the client can be safely deleted as the server object will activate both clients and servers. Activations still last for days.
When a re-activation event, the client will query AD for the Activation Object. In the event that the Active Directory object is unreachable, clients will attempt to use the next available activation method which is the KMS activation method.
If you unjoin a client from the domain, activation will fail on the next license evaluation. This typically occurs when a system is rebooted or the Software Protection Service is restarted. It leads to wonky behavior. You must be a registered user to add a comment. If you've already registered, sign in.
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